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COMMENTS
POSTPARTUM DEPRESSION: A DEFENSE FOR
MOTHERS WHO KILL THEIR INFANTS
1. INTRODUCTION
Children have always held a sacred place in our soci-
ety-representing the future, hope, and a generation's beginning.'
Euripides summarized this feeling when he asked, "[w]hat greater
grief can there be for mortals than to see their children dead?" 2
With that in mind, consider the following situation: A healthy,
twenty-four year old woman decides that she and her husband want
to have a child. There is no history of psychiatric problems in her
family nor her husband's family. Her doctor assures her that, consid-
ering her medical history, age, and excellent physical condition, she
should not have any problems with a pregnancy.
The woman proceeds to get pregnant, has a normal pregnancy,
and, ultimately, a healthy child. Two days after giving birth, both
mother and child are allowed to go home. The woman expresses
some apprehension about taking the child home, but her doctor as-
sures her that she should not be worried because all new mothers are
initially apprehensive about their ability to take care of an infant.
While at home, soon thereafter, the woman starts having "bad
thoughts"-thoughts of hurting the baby and hurting herself. She is
continually crying for no apparent reason, is unusually quiet, with-
drawn, and becomes emotionally upset over trivial matters. Her hus-
band notices that his wife is different since she returned from the
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1. "Of all nature's gifts to the human race, what is sweeter to a man than his children?"
STEVENSON, THE HOME BOOK OF QUOTATIONS: CLASSICAL AND MODERN 253 (10th ed.
1967) (quoting CICERO, POST REDITUM AD QUIRITES, ch. i, § 2).
2. MENKEN, A NEW DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS FROM ANCIENT AND MODERN
SOURCES 127 (1962) (quoting EURIPIDES, THE SUPPLIANT WOMAN (421 B.C.)).
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hospital, and he informs their doctor of his concern. Once again, the
doctor says not to worry and assures the husband that these feelings
are normal for new mothers and that they will pass in time. These
thoughts do not pass, and, instead, they become increasingly persis-
tent. Ultimately, the woman is so confused and delusional that her
sense of reality is lost, and she begins to think of the child as the
devil.
When the baby is two weeks old, the mother hears him crying.
She goes into his room and sees the devil in her child's crib, spouting
fire from his mouth. She immediately takes a pillow and smothers
the fire to kill the devil. In so doing, the mother believes that she is
actually saving her child from the devil, although her perception of
reality is warped and thoughts of her child may be completely re-
placed by or confused with her delusions. What she has unknow-
ingly done, in fact, is suffocate her child, killing him in a matter of
seconds. The mother is then charged with first degree murder.
This situation is a startling example of opposing feelings at
work in a woman's mind after childbirth. On the one hand, the wo-
man loves and wants her child very much and will do anything to
protect it, yet, at the very same time, she is compelled to take its life.
What happened? The answer is that this woman is suffering from
severe postpartum depression,' an area of psychiatric medicine that
has been largely ignored by the legal and medical communities in the
United States for the past sixty years."
3. The phrase "postpartum depression" will be used in this comment to refer to the
most severe syndrome of postpartum depression. Most scientists agree that there are three
distinct categories within what is commonly referred to as postpartum depression. The first is
the most common, occurring in fifty to eighty percent of all women after childbirth, and is
known as the "baby blues." The second form occurs in eight to twelve percent of all women, is
more severe than the first, and is termed "postpartum depression." "What's becoming conven-
tional is for the term 'postpartum depression' to describe the middle range-clinical depression
that is not psychotic." Mansnerus, Disturbing Questions on the Darkest Side of Postpartum
Blues, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1988, § B, at 1, col. 1. The last form, which is the most severe
form of this illness is puerperal psychosis, or the psychosis which occurs after childbirth. See
generally W. BROWN, PSYCHOLOGICAL CARE DURING PREGNANCY AND THE POSTPARTUM
PERIOD 117-36 (1979); Lee, Postpartum Emotional Disorders, 30 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q.
286 (1984). It is this last, severe form of postpartum depression that this comment will focus
on.
4. Research in the area of postpartum depression began in the early 1800's and rapidly
developed in both the United States and Europe. J. HAMILTON, POSTPARTUM PSYCHIATRIC
PROBLEMS 126-35 (1962). Initially, doctors treated women suffering from postpartum depres-
sion through bleeding and physical restraint. Id. at 127. However, by the mid-1800's, as scien-
tists began discovering more about this disorder, doctors used opium and Indian hemp to cure
the postpartum depression experienced by many women. Id. As research in this area continued
to develop, scientists began hypothesizing on ways to classify this disorder. In France and
England, scientists believed postpartum depression to be a category of mental illness with char-
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Experts estimate that fifty to eighty percent of all women expe-
rience some form of depression after childbirth, 5 but only one to two
per 1000 women experience its most severe form, puerperal psycho-
sis.6 This latter form is the most dangerous, both to the mother and
the child, because both suicidal' and infanticidal8 thoughts are pre-
sent, making the woman dissociated, delusional, and confused." The
overall effect is to cause a woman to lose her "sense of reality."1
Despite its severe and traumatic effects on women after child-
birth, puerperal psychosis is not recognized in California as a psy-
chosis sufficient to fall within the insanity defense. As such, women
who suffer from this debilitating mental impairment are tried as if
no mental impairment existed, subjecting these disturbed women to
the possibility of life in prison or even death" for acts over which
acteristics distinguishing it from other varieties of mental illness. Id. at 128-30. However, a
differing view of postpartum depression developed in the United States at this time. In 1926,
the authors Strecker and Ebaugh concluded that since postpartum depression cases could be
classified within standard categories of psychiatric illness, the term "postpartum psychosis"
was superfluous and should be discarded from psychiatric terminology. Id. at 132. Hence,
research in the United States virtually stopped around 1926, while similar research in Europe
continued.
One reflection of America's disregard of this disorder is seen in the American Psychiatric
Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders which does not classify
postpartum disorders in their own, distinct category. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSoCIA-
TION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980) (here-
inafter DSM-nII]. The 1962 publication of Postpartum Psychiatric Problems, by James Alexan-
der Hamilton, was the first book written in America since 1926 dealing with postpartum
depression. Despite a somewhat renewed interes; in this area, research in America has been
sparse and stagnant, and "[t]he history of postpartum psychiatric problems suggests that reas-
sessment of this field is long overdue." J. HAMILTON, POSTPARTUM PSYCHIATRIC PROBLEMS
135 (1962). Legislation "aimed at assisting peace officers in identifying suspects in child abuse
or death cases who may be suffering from postpartum psychosis" was recently approved by the
California Assembly, suggesting that this "reassessment" has already begun. Jordan, Assembly
Approves Postpartum Psychosis Bill, L.A. Daily J., July 21, 1989, at 3, col. 2.
5. Trigoboff, Postpartum Blues: Cases Test Use As Murder Defense, L.A. Daily J.,
Dec. 16, 1987, at 1, col. 3. See also Lee, supra note 3, at 286-89 (detailed statistical analysis
of postpartum emotional disorders); W. BROWN, supra note 3, at 119-20 (comprehensive dis-
cussion of postpartum blues).
6. Mansnerus, supra note 3, at 6. See also W. BROWN, supra note 3, at 121; Lee,
supra note 3, at 289. "Puerperal" is defined as the period of time following childbirth. WEB-
STER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1838 (1971).
7. Lee, supra note 3, at 292. See generally Murray v. St. Mary's Hosp., 280 A.D. 803
113 N.Y.S.2d 104, (1952).
8. M. SANDLER, MENTAL ILLNESS IN PREGNANCY AND THE PUERPERIUM 114 (1978).
Infanticide is defined as "the murder or killing of an infant soon after its birth." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 699 (5th ed. 1979).
9. Lee, supra note 3, at 293.
10. Mansnerus, supra note 3, at 6, col. 1.
11. Trigoboff, supra note 5, at 1, col. 3.
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (Deering Supp. 1988).
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they had no control.
This comment addresses the problem of conflicting judicial
holdings in cases where a woman kills her child as a result of suffer-
ing from postpartum depression. Part II provides a medical and legal
background of postpartum depression and examines the case history
of its use as a defense. The comment next discusses some of the
problems created through inconsistent utilization of a postpartum de-
pression defense in our states' criminal justice systems. Part IV ana-
lyzes the differing approaches taken by state courts and the complete
lack of legislative guidance for these courts in this area of law. Fi-
nally, legislation is offered for the clarification of the crime of infan-
ticide as a distinct crime and for the establishment of a postpartum
depression defense, akin to the insanity defense,"3 in cases of infanti-
cide in California. The proposal offers a model for all state legisla-
tures to develop guidelines for courts evaluating a mother's criminal
actions towards her child while suffering from postpartum depres-
sion, in order to determine if those actions fall within the state's in-
sanity defense.
II. BACKGROUND
The depressed state a woman exhibits following childbirth has
been a recognized phenomenon for centuries. Hippocrates first de-
scribed postpartum depression and the symptoms associated with it
in the early fourth century. He speculated that lochial 4 discharge
could be carried toward the head resulting in agitation, delirium, and
attacks of mania and, further, "when blood collects at the breast of
women, it indicates madness."' 5 Unfortunately, today we are not
much closer to understanding the basis for these disorders or their
cure or treatment.1
13. Id. § 25 (Deering 1985).
14. Lochial is defined as "a discharge from the uterus and vagina following delivery."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1328 (1971).
15. W. BROWN, supra note 3, at 127. See also J. HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 126.
16. There are many theories on the causes of postpartum depression. However, research
in this area has been inconclusive, and there are no established or universally accepted causes
or predisposing factors. Some researchers have speculated that hormonal changes after child-
birth account for a mother's increased vulnerability to psychiatric illness in the weeks and
months following childbirth, M. SANDLER, supra note 8, at 80-89; W. BROWN, supra note 3,
at 122, while others postulate that the stresses of childbirth and the new responsibilities associ-
ated with motherhood account for this phenomena. M. SANDLER, supra note 8, at 69. Still
others claim that age is a relevant factor and that "single women and first-time mothers are
more vulnerable to postpartum psychiatric disorders." Mansnerus, supra note 3, at 1. Finally,
some researchers believe that mothers with a previous occurrence of postpartum depression are
at higher risk of having a relapse with a subsequent pregnancy. Lee, supra note 3, at 290. See
[Vol. 30
1990] POSTPARTUM DEPRESSION
Much of the early research on postpartum emotional disorders
was conducted in Europe, where infanticide1 7 was commonplace in
society.' Unwed mothers would often kill their children shortly after
birth in an attempt to hide their pregnancy and avoid social disgrace.
Hence, the first legislation dealing with this area of law was passed
in England in 1623, and was confined to bastard children as vic-
tims."' The crime of murder of children born in wedlock, considered
distinctly different from the crime of murdering illegitimate children,
was treated as any other crime of homicide until the early twentieth
century.20
England has had legislation dealing with the crime of infanti-
cide, covering both children born in and out of wedlock, for over
sixty years. The Infanticide Act of 1922, which was later amended
in 1938,21 establishes that if a mother kills her child within the first
twelve months of pregnancy, the criminal charge brought against her
will automatically be reduced from murder to involuntary man-
slaughter.2 " This "automatic" reduction was a legislative response to
generally M. SANDLER, supra note 8, at 25-90 (comprehensive discussion of various factors
and hypotheses in regards to the causation of postpartum depression).
17. See supra note 8.
18. O'Donovan, The Medicalisation of Infanticide, 1984 CRIM. L. REV. 259, 260 (this
article gives a complete history of infanticide in England). For a complete history of infanticide
in Canada, see Backhouse, Desperate Women and Compassionate Courts: Infanticide in
Nineteenth-Century Canada, 34 U. TORONTO L.J. 447 (1984).
19. O'Donovan, supra note 18, at 259.
20. The distinction between the killing of a legitimate child, one born in wedlock, and
the killing of an illegitimate child, one born out of wedlock, is also seen in other European and
Asian countries. For example, in Italy there is a distinct crime of "infanticide for reasons of
honor." Under this law, "whoever causes the death of a child immediately after its birth...
in order to save his own honor or that of a close relative shall be punished by imprisonment for
from three to ten years." Italian Penal Code, 23 AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL
CODES 193 (E. Mise & A. Maitlin trans. 1978). However, the crime of homicide is distinct
from this crime: "whoever causes the death of a human being shall be punished by imprison-
ment for not less than twenty-one years." Id. at 192. Additionally, many other Asian and
European nations legally recognize a disturbed mental state in a woman following childbirth
and have passed infanticide statutes recognizing such. See Finland, 27 AMERICAN SERIES OF
FOREIGN PENAL CODES 71 (M. Joulsen trans. 1987); Sweden, 17 AMERICAN SERIES OF FOR-
EIGN PENAL CODES 17 (T. Sellin trans. 1972). See generally Penal Code of the Federal
Republic of Germany, 28 AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES 177 (J. Darby trans.
1987); Austria, 12 AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES 66-67 (N. West & S. Shu-
man trans. 1966); Korean Criminal Code, AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES 109
(G. Mueller trans. 1960).
21. The Infanticide Act of 1938 reformed the 1922 Act in two distinct ways. First, it
altered the definition of the victims of infanticide from "newly born" to "under the age of
twelve months." Secondly, the 1938 Act "extended the medicalisation of the crime through the
addition of the language about 'the effect of lactation.' " O'Donovan, supra note 18, at 261.
22. The Infanticide Act of 1938 states:
Where a woman by any willful act or omission causes the death of her child
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the recognition of the existence of postpartum depression, which
causes a deranged mental state in a mother following childbirth.28
Should a woman be found guilty of infanticide under this Act, sen-
tencing is placed in the judge's discretion, which usually results in
probation or hospitalization.24
In contrast, the United States has no legislation dealing specifi-
cally with the crime of infanticide; the killing of a child by its mother
is treated like any other crime of homicide. 25 Additionally, neither
the medical nor the legal community "officially" recognizes a de-
ranged mental state of a woman following childbirth.26 The Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association "tends to set guidelines for the legal pro-
fession ' 12 7 by publishing a Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM-III)28 which classifies various mental con-
ditions and their associated symptoms. However, DSM-III currently
"recognizes no more or less stress in a woman in the postpartum
period than any other woman of her age under stress. "29
Despite the failure of the medical community to recognize post-
partum depression as a distinct category of illness, physicians fre-
quently continue to diagnose this condition."0 The ambivalence of the
medical community is of little value to the legal community, which
looks to the medical profession for guidance in the area of defining
and distinguishing psychiatric disorders."1 Moreover, the legal com-
under the age of twelve months, but at the time of the act or omission the bal-
ance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not having fully recovered from
the effect of giving birth to the child or by reason of the effect of lactation
consequent upon the birth of the child, then notwithstanding that the circum-
stances were such that the offense would have amounted to murder, she shall be
guilty . . . of infanticide and may . . . be dealt with and punished as if she had
been guilty of the offense of manslaughter of the child.
Parker & Good, Infanticide, 5 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 237 (1981).
23. "It is not necessary to demonstrate a causal relationship between the mental imbal-
ance and the homicide, which is, in any case, implicit in the Act [Infanticide Act of 1938[ and
therefore conceded by the prosecution." Id. at 238.
24. Id.
25. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (Deering 1985). The specific crime of infan-
ticide is not addressed by the California legislature; thus, the crime of a mother killing her
child falls within the general provisions of homicide.
26. Trigoboff, supra note 5, at I, col. 3. See also DSM III, supra note 4.
27. Trigoboff, supra note 5, at 1, col. 3.
28. DSM-III, supra note 4, at 1.
29. Trigoboff, supra note 5, at 1, col. 3.
30. "It [postpartum depression] happens so frequently as to be normative." Mansnerus,
supra note 3, at 1, col. 2 (quoting Dr. Carolyn E. Cutrona, Assistant Professor of psychology
at the University of Iowa).
31. "[Mjodern jurisprudence has continued to concentrate its reform efforts on the task
of conforming legal theories of 'insanity' to prevailing medical theory." Note, A Ship of Fools:
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munity receives little guidance from the American public in defining
and distinguishing psychiatric disorders, due to the differing views of
the usefulness of the insanity defense in the American criminal jus-
tice system."2
One result of the lack of guidance for the legal community in
this area of law is that different tests of insanity are accepted in
various states; the predominant tests being the American Law Insti-
tute test, the M'Naughten test, the irresistible impulse test, and the
Durham "product" test.88 Inconsistent holdings inherently arise
when applying these differing tests of insanity from state to state, as
opposed to following one uniform guideline. Additionally, the prob-
lem of establishing judicial consistency in cases of infanticide is wors-
ened by the nonexistence of legislation specifically dealing with the
crime committed. Without specific laws to guide them, courts are
forced to decide these cases on an ad hoc basis, making it difficult to
establish guiding, consistent precedent.
Nonetheless, when dealing with the crime of infanticide the
Contemporary Legal Attitudes Towards the Disordered Criminal Defendant, 52 UMKC L.
REV. 443, 457 (1984). See generally The Insanity Defense, ABA and APA Proposals for
Change, 7 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 136 (1983) [hereinafter ABA and APA Proposals]
(general agreement between the American Bar Association, American Psychiatry Association,
and the United States Justice Department on endorsing the M'Naughten test for insanity).
32. Many of these opposing views are based upon the inherent moral conflict posed by
the concept of punishing someone who did not intend their acts. "To label as criminals those so
severely disturbed that they could not appreciate the wrongfulness of their acts offends the
moral tenets of the criminal law and, we [APA] submit, would offend the moral intuitions of
the community." Id. at 137. These views are based on the concept that "psychiatry and the
law are antithetical as to purpose and function." Note, supra note 31, at 460. While the
mental health system is devoted to therapeutic rehabilitation, the criminal justice system is
punitive, and for the most part unconcerned with therapeutic rehabilitation. Note, supra note
31, at 460.
33. These four tests are used in the United States to measure insanity. The first is the
American Law Institute test, which states that "a person is not responsible for criminal con-
duct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, at 66 (Proposed Official
Draft 1962).
The second test utilized to measure insanity is the M'Naughten test, which is used in a
majority of states today. The M'Naughten test does not hold a person criminally responsible if,
at the time of the act, he was laboring under such a defect of reason, from a disease of the
mind, as not to know the nature and quality of his act. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, HORNBOOK
ON CRIMINAL LAW § 4.2, at 311 (2d ed. 1986).
The third test of insanity is the irresistible impulse test, which, simply stated, means that
the person has a mental disease which keeps him from controlling his conduct. Id. at 320.
The fourth test used to measure insanity is the Durham "product" test, which establishes
that a person is innocent if the unlawful act he committed was a product of a mental disease or
defect. Id. at 323. For a more comprehensive examination of these differing tests of insanity,
see generally ABA and APA Proposals, supra note 31 and Note, supra note 31.
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American criminal justice system generally takes one of three ap-
proaches. The first approach is for the district attorney to choose not
to prosecute these women at all for lack of evidence or the inability
to prove the mother's sanity at the time of the crime.84 The second
approach is for the court to refuse to accept postpartum depression
as a valid defense and instead convict the women of varying degrees
of murder. 5 The third approach courts may take is to accept post-
partum depression as a valid defense, and sentence the mother to
probation and/or commit her to psychiatric help."6 This final ap-
proach deals with the mother in much the same way as a legally
insane defendant.
A. No Charges Brought
Some prosecutors refuse to bring charges against a mother who
kills her child shortly after giving birth for lack of evidence or the
inability to prove the sanity of the woman at the time of the incident.
In these cases, it is more of a practical decision by the district attor-
ney not to prosecute these women than a judgment by the courts on
the issue of the validity of using puerperal insanity as a defense to
murder. For example, evidence of a woman's impaired reasoning
and deranged state of mind while suffering from puerperal psychosis
is readily displayed by her unusual hallucinations and severe depres-
sion. Additionally, evidence of malice aforethought is directly rebut-
ted by the woman's own actions prior to the child's death, such as
her taking classes on how to care for her child and how to be a
"good mother." This conflicting evidence contributes to the prosecu-
tion's inability to prove the woman's sanity at the time of the alleged
crime, and hence their decision to not press charges against the
woman.
One case in which the prosecution took this approach involved
Michele Remington, who, in 1987, gave birth to her first child,
Joshua. 7 Remington had no history of psychiatric problems, was ex-
cited about her pregnancy, and looked forward to motherhood.
After giving birth, Remington was not allowed to take Joshua
home because the child had trouble during delivery. During this time
34. See infra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 46-85 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 86-110 and accompanying text.
37. Donahue: Postpartum Depression (ABC television broadcast, August - , 1988)
(transcript #021788 on file at Santa Clara Law Review office). This case never went to trial
so the author has based her facts solely upon this transcript and the interview therein.
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apart from her baby, Remington began to feel "cheated" 8 because,
while other new mothers were allowed to take their children home
after birth, she was not. This "normal" feeling began to overwhelm
her, so much so that when Joshua finally came home three weeks
later, Remington's feelings of being "cheated" were so magnified
that she became unusually depressed, was unable to sleep, and had
to force herself to eat. "She [Remington] wasn't doing anything." 9
Unexpectedly during this "depressed" state, Remington took a
family gun, shot and killed her six week old baby, and then turned
the gun on herself. While recovering in the hospital thereafter, Rem-
ington was diagnosed as suffering from severe postpartum depres-
sion. The district attorney in Bennington, Vermont, failed to ac-
knowledge this as a viable defense and charged Remington with the
first degree murder of her infant son. Nonetheless, one week later all
charges were dropped because the prosecution was unable to find
experts willing to testify to establish Remington's sanity at the time
of the shooting.40
The case of Theresa Pearson failed to make it to trial for simi-
lar reasons.41 Pearson, who had no history of psychiatric problems,
became delusional after giving birth to a daughter, Carly. Despite
her prior excitement about having the child, Pearson began exper-
iencing persistent feelings of despair and regret over the birth of her
baby.' Immediately thereafter, Pearson was diagnosed as suffering
from severe postpartum depression and was placed in a psychiatric
unit at a local hospital because of the serious threat she posed to both
herself and her child.
Seemingly recovered, Pearson was released from the hospital
about a month later with instructions to continue her medication and
her visits to her doctor. To be safe, however, Pearson's family was
instructed not to leave Pearson alone with her baby for long periods
of time. Nevertheless, Pearson attempted to kill her baby soon after
her release and was readmitted to the psychiatric unit. While hospi-
talized, Pearson remained delusional and confused and told a nurse
38. Id. at 6 (statement by Michele Remington).
39. Id. (statement of Jeff Remington, husband of Michele Remington).
40. Id. at 5.
41. See generally Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 39 Ohio St. 3d 86, 529 N.E.2d
449 (1988). This civil suit for wrongful death and malpractice was brought by the executrix
for Carly Pearson against the hospital and psychologist who treated Carly's mother, Theresa
Pearson. Theresa Pearson killed Carly after being released from hospitalization while suffer-
ing from severe postpartum depression.
42. Id. at 87, 529 N.E.2d at 450.
1990]
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that she planned to inject the baby with something to kill her 4 -a
statement she later withdrew, claiming she did not want to hurt the
baby. Hence, Pearson was released again.
Upon returning home, Pearson was left alone with Carly long
enough to administer a deadly overdose of aspirin." Despite Carly's
death, criminal charges were never brought against Pearson due to
her medically established and well recognized mental problems after
Carly's birth.4
Both of the foregoing cases represent decisions by district attor-
neys not to proceed with charges against the mother, despite her
criminal actions. Prosecutors faced with defendants who have obvi-
ous mental impairments such as these, which manifest themselves in
harmful actions toward both the mother and the child, are willing to
accept the proposition that the woman was not legally sane at the
time of the incident. Thus, prosecutors make a practical decision not
to pursue bringing charges against these women.
B. Refusal to Accept Defense
When a mother's harmful actions are not self-directed but
rather are directed only at her child, the majority of courts that deal
with the crime of infanticide do not recognize postpartum depression
as a mental impairment sufficient to establish an insanity defense.
This is due in part to the lack of knowledge of this illness, its symp-
toms, causes, and treatments, and its overall lack of recognition in
the United States.
43. Id. at 88, 529 N.E.2d at 451.
44. Id. at 90, 529 N.E.2d at 453.
45. Although a criminal case never ensued, a civil suit was brought by Carly's adminis-
tratrix against the hospital and psychologist. See Littleton, 39 Ohio St. 3d 86, 529 N.E.2d 449
(1988). A similar civil case involving postpartum depression is Murray v. St. Mary's Hosp.,
280 A.D. 803, 113 N.Y.S.2d 104, (1952). This case was brought by the husband of a woman
who committed suicide shortly after giving birth by jumping from a window of her room in the
defendant hospital. This woman was suffering from severe postpartum psychosis following the
delivery of her child and was unattended at the time of the incident.
A suit was filed against the hospital and doctor who treated the woman, and the appellate
court held that the hospital was under a duty to use reasonable care to prevent its patients
from injuring themselves. Further, the appellate court held that the doctor's lack of knowledge
about his patient's mental condition caused him to not take precautions that he might other-
wise have taken. On remand to the trial court, both the hospital and the doctor were held
potentially liable for damages. Id. at 803-05, 113 N.Y.S.2d 104-06. It must be noted, however,
that this civil case utilized a different burden of proof than that of the criminal cases discussed
in this comment. This civil case used a "preponderance of evidence" standard, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1064 (5th ed. 1979), which is a much lower burden of proof than the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard, id. at 147, utilized in the criminal cases herein.
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1. Complete Rejection of Defense to Murder
Courts in the United States have refused to recognize postpar-
tum depression as a defense similar to insanity in varying degrees
since it was first asserted as a defense. The majority of these courts
have refused to accept postpartum depression as a complete defense
to murder. In State v. White,"' an early case to take this approach, a
nineteen year old mother was convicted of voluntary manslaughter of
her infant daughter because the court rejected her unique defense
under Idaho's insanity test.47
In this case, Janet White, a healthy mother of two children,
was changing her three month old infant, when, as she later said,
"my mind snapped, and I threw her on the floor" '48 whereupon the
child died an hour later from a skull fracture. After her baby's
death, White exhibited further unusual behavior, appearing with-
drawn and showing no remorse over the death of her child. Upon
questioning White the police became suspicious and took her into
custody. She was examined and diagnosed as suffering from severe
postpartum depression whereupon she was hospitalized.
White was charged with voluntary manslaughter, to which she
claimed the defense of insanity. At trial, varying expert testimony on
her medical condition and state of mind at the time of the crime was
presented.49 The doctor who had initially examined her testified that
White was suffering from severe postpartum depression, a condition
which had afflicted her continually since the birth of her first child.5"
This testimony, however, was rebutted by the state's expert who
claimed that White was sane, and, further, that the "snapping" of
White's mind "was a rationalization for the act [killing the child]",
" and he "doubted whether she went into a psychotic depressive
reaction at the time of the incident." 52
White was convicted and appealed, but the appellate court up-
held her conviction because the jury instructions used by the trial
judge were sufficient to establish the grounds for Idaho's insanity
46. 93 Idaho 153, 456 P.2d 797 (1969).
47. Idaho used the American Law Institute test to measure insanity. See supra note 33
and accompanying text.
48. While, 93 Idaho at 154, 456 P.2d at 798.
49. Id. at 154-55, 456 P.2d at 798-99.
50. Id. at 154, 456 P.2d at 798 (White had her second child only eleven months after
her first, which "aggravated [her] existing postpartum depression." Id.).
51. Id. at 154, 456 P.2d at 798.
52. Id. (emphasis added). See generally supra note 16 (illustrating the varying degrees
of acceptance of postpartum depressive syndromes by the medical community).
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test,5 providing that a jury could reasonably conclude that White
was sane at the time of the incident. Although elaborating on
White's mental capacity as a result of an abusive childhood and bro-
ken family setting, the court nonetheless refused to recognize her
unique defense and affirmed the trial court decision.5 '
Similarly, the court in the highly publicized case of Common-
wealth v. Comitz5 5 refused to accept postpartum depression as a
complete defense to murder. In this case, Sharon Comitz threw her
four week old son, Garret, off a bridge and into an icy stream. 56 She
then proceeded to tell the police that Garret had been kidnapped
from her car while it was parked at a shopping center. However,
police eventually uncovered evidence implicating Comitz in her son's
death, and Comitz was charged with first and third degree murder.
She initially entered a plea of not guilty to each offense, but agreed
to plead guilty with the defense of mental illness to the charge of
third degree murder.
Throughout the trial, the court noted Comitz's history of de-
pressions associated with childbirth. Following the birth of her first
child, Nicole, Comitz suffered from severe postpartum depression
and commented that she could not be left alone with Nicole because
she was afraid she was going to kill her.57 Comitz recovered shortly
thereafter and was able to resume a normal relationship with her
daughter. While pregnant with Garret, however, Comitz once again
became depressed and expressed concern over her depression, telling
a friend that she was afraid that "what happened to Nicole [afraid
she would kill her] would happen to the new baby."' 58 Despite this
evidence, the jury found Comitz to be criminally responsible for her
acts.
Following testimony and argument at sentencing, the trial court
determined that Comitz was not "severely mentally disabled ' 59 and
sentenced her to a term of eight to twenty years imprisonment, 60 ex-
emplifying the traditional American legal system's refusal to accept
53. White, 93 Idaho at 156, 456 at 802.
54. Id. at 160, 456 P.2d at 804. The appellate court concentrated on evaluating the
instructions used at the trial level. Upon reviewing these instructions and their application to
the facts of this case, the appellate court held that these instructions were proper and affirmed
the decision of the trial court. Id. at 155-60, 456 P.2d at 799-804.
55. 365 Pa. Super. 599, 530 A.2d 473 (1987).
56. Id. at 601, 530 A.2d at 474.
57. Id. at 602-03 n.3, 530 A.2d at 474-75 n.3.
58. Id. at 603, 530 A.2d at 474-75.
59. Id. at 602, 530 A.2d at 474.
60. Id.
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postpartum depression as a defense sufficient to fall within the in-
sanity defense.
2. Rejection of Defense to Attempted Murder
In addition to rejecting postpartum depression as a complete de-
fense to murder, courts have also taken a strong stance on rejecting
the defense in cases where a mother is unsuccessful in killing her
child and charged with attempted murder. 61 One case exemplifying
this approach is Clark v. State.6 2
One evening, for no apparent reason, Pamela Sue Clark
wrapped her baby in a blanket and abandoned it in the desert. Clark
later told her husband that the baby was kidnapped. When the po-
lice arrived, Clark explained how someone had grabbed her from
behind, knocked her unconscious, and when she awoke, the baby was
gone. However, the police noted that there were no signs of forced
entry or visible injuries to Clark, and she appeared unusually calm
and unemotional. Three days later, Clark admitted she abandoned
her baby and directed the police to where she left the child, where-
upon the child was immediately retrieved.
Clark was charged with attempted murder and her defense was
insanity. The psychiatrist who examined her testified "that severe
postpartum depression rendered [Clark] legally insane at the time of
the crime."6 Members of Clark's family, however, testified that her
conduct was normal immediately preceding the crime, and it was
only after the alleged crime that they "noticed a change in her per-
sonality."6 Based upon this testimony, the jury concluded that the
evidence was inadequate to overcome the presumption of Clark's
sanity.
The appellate court affirmed the decision, noting that the jury
could reasonably find Clark's evidence to be insufficient to dispel the
presumption of sanity.65 Another factor which was important to the
jury was the element of time. Although the jury might have believed
that Clark could not control her immediate responses to her child
because she suffered from postpartum depression, the jury had diffi-
61. Unsuccessful attempts at murdering children during a state of puerperal psychosis
may be related to child abuse and neglect. See W. BROWN, supra note 3, at 131-32 (discussion
of possible effects of postpartum psychiatric problems on infants); M. SANDLER, supra note 8,
at 112-19.
62. 95 Nev. 24, 588 P.2d 1027 (1979).
63. Id. at 27, 588 P.2d at 1029.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 28-29, 588 P.2d at 1030.
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culty believing a mother could drive many miles to a deserted road
and abandon her baby, without having time to reflect on the situa-
tion and control her actions.
The majority opinion in the United States today is in accor-
dance with these cases, rejecting postpartum depression as a complete
defense. 6
3. Defense as a Mitigating Factor at Sentencing
Some courts have taken a strong stance in rejecting postpartum
depression as a complete defense to varying degrees of murder when
presented with fact patterns that do'not clearly demonstrate the req-
uisite legal definition of insanity. However, other courts have taken a
compromise approach in order to alleviate the inherent concerns
presented when a mentally disturbed woman, sufferjng from this
condition, is held criminally responsible. Instead of accepting post-
partum depression as a complete defense to murder, these courts use
postpartum depression as a mitigating factor at sentencing.
One such case was Faunteroy v. United States." In 1980, Ti-
juana Faunteroy was convicted of involuntary manslaughter after be-
ing charged with killing her two month old son by failing to feed the
child. One of Faunteroy's arguments at trial was that because she
suffered from postpartum depression, she was unable to breast feed
the baby adequately. This argument was rejected by an expert wit-
ness for the state who testified that "the effects of postpartum de-
pression on a mother would not influence whether an infant digested
his food in that a baby could obtain sufficient nutrition if it were fed
adequate amounts [of milk], regardless of the mother's depression."68
Additionally, testimony was given at trial indicating that Faunteroy
was urged to seek medical help for the baby because he looked un-
dernourished, 9 yet Faunteroy failed and refused to take any medical
action.
Faunteroy was convicted, but the jury noted her apparent post-
partum depression as being a factor in her inability to breast feed the
66. The state courts throughout the United States have traditionally been very conserva-
tive in their approach to this area of law, denying the existence of such a medical or legal
defense. See, e.g., State v. White, 93 Idaho 153, 456 P.2d 797 (1969), Commonwealth v.
Comitz, 365 Pa. Super. 599, 530 A.2d 473 (1987), and Clark, 95 Nev. 24, 588 P.2d 1027
(1979). However, the trend seems to be moving away from this traditional approach to a more
tolerant view of the validity of postpartum depression as a defense to infanticide. See infra
notes 86-110 and accompanying text.
67. 413 A.2d 1294 (D.C. 1980).
68. Id. at 1296.
69. Id. at 1297.
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child, one of the main reasons for the child's death. The jury, how-
ever, did not excuse her actions on these grounds. 0 Relying upon the
testimony given at trial, the jury refused to accept her postpartum
depression as a complete defense, although they recognized it as a
mitigating factor in convicting her of involuntary manslaughter and
not murder.7 1
Another case which considered postpartum depression as a miti-
gating factor occurred in West Virginia.7 2 Kathleen Householder
was successful in using postpartum depression to plead guilty to a
reduced charge of involuntary manslaughter, after initially being
charged with murder.7 8
As in many of the previously discussed cases, Householder orig-
inally reported to the police that her two week old daughter was
kidnapped. Further, Householder made emotional appeals on local
television for the child's return. However, she soon began offering
police several versions on how the child disappeared. Eventually,
Householder told police that she was unusually annoyed by, and
frustrated with, the noise her children were making, so she uncon-
trollably threw a rock and struck her two week old daughter. After
throwing the rock, Householder claimed she lost control of her ac-
tions, put the baby in a plastic trash bag, and drove to the Shenan-
doah River, where she threw the bag with the child into the water.74
Householder was diagnosed as suffering from severe postpartum de-
pression during this incident, and despite her severe criminal actions,
she was successful in using this condition to plea bargain to a re-
duced charge and sentence. 5
A recent case to use postpartum depression as a mitigating fac-
tor was State v. Holden,"" wherein seventeen year old Shelia Diane
Holden told police that her daughter, Dekavia, was kidnapped.
Holden claimed that while she was walking at a nearby pond, two
men snatched Dekavia from her arms and drove away in a large
white automobile. Holden showed police the pond and, although
they could not find any tire tracks, police did find Dekavia's body
floating some twenty feet away.
Holden gave police a description of her assailants and continued
70. Id. at 1300-01.
71. Id.
72. See Trigoboff, supra note 5, at 24.
73. Trigoboff, supra note 5, at 24.
74. Trigoboff, supra note 5, at 24.
75. Trigoboff, supra note 5, at 24.
76. 321 N.C. 689, 365 S.E.2d 626 (1988).
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her story for about a month, at which time she confessed that she
had thrown the baby into the water. Holden claimed she killed the
baby because the baby's father and his family disliked Dekavia and
acted as if she were "in the way.
7 7
Additionally, Holden said something kept telling her to "throw
the baby into the water, and everything would be all right."'7 8 At
trial an expert testified that Holden suffered from auditory halluci-
nations which censured her and talked about Dekavia.7 9 Nonethe-
less, Holden testified that after throwing the baby into the pond she
"started to . . .jump in"8 and get Dekavia out, but stopped and
thought "I'll just let her go."'" This rationalization, demonstrating
Holden's perception of reality, was a key point used by the prosecu-
tion to prove Holden's sanity.
Holden's extensive, abusive history was examined by the court
and she was shown to suffer from many problems including postpar-
tum depression and abused spouse syndrome.8" As a result of these
problems, the defense's expert witness characterized Holden as being
"psychologically paralyzed." '83 Nonetheless, the trial judge failed to
find that her psychological condition impaired her actions and found
her guilty of second-degree murder. He did, however, consider
Holden's many problems, including postpartum depression, as miti-
gating factors at sentencing.8' This decision was affirmed by the ap-
pellate court.85
The foregoing cases represent the majority view of courts in the
United States not to accept the defense of postpartum depression as
sufficient to constitute an insanity defense. This rejection of the de-
fense, however, has been accomplished in various degrees. Many
cases in which the defense of postpartum depression arises are flatly
rejected because they do not present fact patterns clearly falling
77. Id. at 692, 365 S.E.2d at 627.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 693, 365 S.E.2d at 628.
80. Id. at 692, 365 S.E.2d at 627.
81. Id. at 692, 365 S.E.2d at 627.
82. Abused spouse syndrome is also known as the battered wife syndrome and is defined
as "a pattern of severe physical and psychological abuse inflicted upon a woman by her mate."
Bascelli, A Cry For Help: An Analysis of Wife Abuse, 13 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 165, 175
(1986) (comprehensive examination of wife abuse).
83. Holden, 321 N.C. at 693, 365 S.E.2d at 628.
84. Id. at 694, 365 S.E.2d at 628-29. Although postpartum depression was seen as a
mitigating factor, this along with other mitigating factors was insufficient to outweigh the ag-
gravating factors found by the trial judge, and Holden was sentenced to life imprisonment to
be served as a committed youthful offender. Id.
85. Id. at 698, 365 S.E.2d at 631.
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within the "legal" definition of insanity.
Other cases, however, have facts demonstrating unusual and
clearly "abnormal" behavior, which is nonetheless insufficient to fall
within a legally accepted category of defense. In these cases, some
courts choose to take an alternate approach by allowing postpartum
depression to be used as a mitigating factor at sentencing. This ap-
proach considers some of the concerns presented in sentencing a
mentally disturbed woman to severe or prolonged imprisonment
based in large part upon the lack of judicial recognition of her
mental disorder, while still giving the judge the discretion to deter-
mine an appropriate and fair sentence. As such, this approach lies
within the sole discretion of the trial judge and its utilization can be
neither guaranteed nor consistent.
C. Acceptance of Defense
1. Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity
While some courts use postpartum depression only as a mitigat-
ing factor at sentencing, a few liberal courts have recently accepted
postpartum depression as a legitimate defense to murder under the
not guilty by reason of insanity verdict. For example, in Massachu-
setts Le Le Hung Ling, a twenty-three year old mother of two, was
found not guilty by reason of insanity, in part, by using postpartum
depression as a defense to killing her four month old daughter."8
Ling had no recollection whatsoever of having possession of, or giv-
ing birth to, a daughter; she only remembered her two year old son.
When questioned by police about the events that occurred the
night her baby daughter was killed, Ling only mentioned checking
her son's crib and going out for some food. 7 At no time, however,
did Ling mention having a daughter. When Ling's husband arrived
home, he found his daughter sleeping next to his son, cold and stiff.
The baby girl was covered with numerous bites and hematomata s8
about her face, eyes, nose, and swollen head. He immediately took
the baby to the emergency room, where the baby was pronounced
dead on arrival and the police were summoned.
Immediately thereafter, Ling was sent to a maximum security
86. Rosengard, Infanticide of a Female Oriental Neonate, 8 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHI-
ATRY 21, 28-32 (1987). The name of the woman involved in this case was omitted in this
report.
87. Id. at 22.
88. Hematomata is defined as "a tumor or swelling containing blood." WEBSTER'S
NINTH COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 563 (1983).
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facility where she exhibited complete amnesia for the events concern-
ing the alleged murder of her baby, and "her denial [of the existence
of her daughter and the events surrounding the baby's death] contin-
ued in the extreme."89 As time passed Ling "appeared to be increas-
ingly lost in a fugue state, a twilight sleep, and, in a postpartum
depression." 90 Additionally, it was discovered that Ling was previ-
ously hospitalized for "workup and treatment of postpartum depres-
sion" '91 following the birth of her first child.
Upon examination, Ling told psychiatrists a complicated story
about having a sister who had a baby girl, who wanted to kill her
baby. After sixteen months of treatment, however, psychiatrists de-
termined that Ling did not have a sister, and it was actually Ling
herself, using another personality, to portray the murderer.92 In light
of these findings, Ling was found not guilty by reason of insanity
and committed to indefinite hospitalization with periodic review. 8
Similarly, other states have found women suffering from post-
partum depression to be not guilty of murdering their children by
reason of insanity. The case of People v. Green94 is one such exam-
ple. Ann Green, who worked as a pediatric nurse at New York Hos-
pital, caring for over 1000 newborns since 1967, was charged with
two counts of murder and one count of attempted murder. Green
smothered her first newborn in 1980 and her second baby in 1982,
but she was not suspected of any wrongdoing until she tried to kill
her third child in 1985. 5 All three incidents occurred within twenty-
four hours of the infants being taken home from the hospital, each in
good health, and each incident was originally attributed to other fac-
tors such as crib death.
Green claims that she did not intend to hurt any of her children
and supports this contention with the fact that she voluntarily gave
her youngest child to a relative shortly after she attempted to kill
him in order to protect him from additional harm. Further, Green
89. Rosengard, supra note 86, at 26.
90. Rosengard, supra note 86, at 30. "Fugue" is defined as "a pathological disturbance
of consciousness during which the patient performs acts of which he appears to be conscious
but of which on recovery he has no recollection." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 918 (1986).
91. Rosengard, supra note 86, at 26.
92. Rosengard, supra note 86, at 31.
93. Rosengard, supra note 86, at 31-32. See also No. 056-282 (Mass. Sup. Ct., Suffolk
County, Nov. 5, 1986).
94. No. 1273/86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 30, 1988) (cited in Zeldis, Post-partum Psycho-
sis-A Rare Insanity Defense, N.Y. Law J., Sept. 19, 1988, at 2, col. 3.).
95. Id.
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points to the fact that she underwent voluntary sterilization in 1986
to avoid any similar future episodes."
At trial, Green told the New York Supreme Court that she did
not recognize her hands as those holding the pillows over her infants'
faces. The jury believed Green's testimony, and in September 1988,
Ann Green was found not guilty, on all counts, by reason of
insanity. 97
In addition to the aforementioned trial court decisions, two ap-
pellate courts were willing to hear arguments on using postpartum
depression as a valid insanity defense to murder. In so doing, they
reversed lower court decisions refusing to accept such evidence.
One 6ase in which the appellate court took this approach was
People v. Skeoch,98 the earliest reported case to deal with postpartum
depression as a defense to murder in the United States. In 1951,
Dorothy Skeoch was convicted of murder after a trial by jury and
was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of fourteen years. Her
defense was insanity.
Skeoch told police a story of a man breaking into her apart-
ment, stealing her watch, demanding money, and threatening to take
her child if she did not comply with his demands.99 Skeoch claimed
upon hearing these threats that she fainted and when she regained
consciousness her wrist watch was removed and her baby was lying
with a diaper tied around its neck and mouth. When the police ques-
tioned Skeoch and searched her apartment, they found her watch
hidden in a suitcase, whereupon Skeoch admitted that she killed the
child.' 00
The testimony at trial described a behavioral change in Skeoch
following the birth of her child. Prior to the child's birth, Skeoch led
a healthy, "normal" life and was deemed an excellent student who
"possessed a very good reputation as a truthful and law-abiding citi-
zen."' 0 ' However, after going to the hospital for the birth of their
child, Skeoch's husband testified that he observed a change in his
wife; she talked very little, and she was withdrawn, depressed, and
96. Zeldis, Post-Partum Psychosis-A Rare Insanity Defense, N.Y. Law J., Sept. 19,
1988, at 2, col.3.
97. People v. Green, No. 1273/86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Sept. 30, 1988). See also Mansnerus,
supra note 3, at 1; Berg, Postpartum Psychosis Defense Gaining, L.A. Daily J., Oct. 7, 1988,
at 5, col. 1.
98. 408 Il. 276, 96 N.E.2d 473 (1951).
99. Id. at 277, 96 N.E.2d at 474.
100. Id. at 277-78, 96 N.E.2d at 474.
101. Id. at 278, 96 N.E.2d at 474.
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her mind "seemed to be somewhere else."'10 Additionally, the court
noted that although Skeoch had no prior history of psychiatric
problems, she was feeling unusually depressed just prior to her
child's birth and declared, "Sometimes I feel like turning on the gas
and forgetting everything."'1 08 A neurologist and a psychiatrist both
testified that Skeoch was insane as a result of suffering from postpar-
tum psychosis.104 Notwithstanding this testimony, the trial court
found Skeoch sane and convicted her of murder.
The appellate court subsequently reversed and remanded the
case for a new trial because it found that the presumption of Ske-
och's sanity was overcome by the evidence presented at trial. The
appellate court held that, overall, the evidence was sufficient to raise
a reasonable doubt of her sanity at the time of the incident, and the
case was reversed for a new trial in accordance with this holding.108
Another case in which the appellate court was willing to admit
evidence displaying insanity by virtue of suffering from postpartum
depression was People v. Lynch.' Margaret Ann Lynch was found
guilty at the trial court level of first degree murder of her infant
daughter, after the child died of malnutrition. 0 Lynch appealed this
decision, raising the insanity defense.
Lynch gave birth to a baby girl who weighed seven pounds, two
ounces, and one month later the baby was found dead, weighing four
pounds, six ounces. 08 Lynch was questioned by police, gave her
statement, and was arraigned thereafter for first degree murder. The
following day, Lynch was again questioned and a confession was
elicited which revealed that she deliberately withheld food from the
baby.109
At trial, a doctor testified that Lynch was suffering from post-
partum depression after the birth of her daughter and gave evidence
regarding her deranged state of mind. Lynch did not raise the de-
fense of insanity at trial, so this evidence was not allowed. The ap-
pellate court, however, held that this evidence was "material and rel-
evant"' 0 to the case and should therefore be allowed. Hence, the
102. Id. at 279, 96 N.E.2d at 474-75.
103. Id. at 279, 96 N.E.2d at 474.
104. Id. at 280, 96 N.E.2d at 475.
105. Id. at 281, 96 N.E.2d at 475-76.
106. 47 Mich. App. 8, 208 N.W.2d 656 (1973).
107. Id. at 9, 208 N.W.2d at 656.
108. Id. at 9-10, 208 N.W.2d at 656-57.
109. d. at 10, 208 N.W.2d at 657. The court noted that this confession was elicited as
a result of cunning police work.
110. Id. at 15, 22, 208 N.W.2d at 659, 663.
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matter was reversed and a new trial was ordered, wherein the jury
would be instructed on the lesser offense of manslaughter, utilizing
the evidence obtained at Lynch's earlier trial.
The previous cases represent the propensity of a few liberal
trial and appellate courts to accept postpartum depression as a valid
insanity defense to murder. Although these courts represent the mi-
nority of courts in the United States, their's are also some of the
more recent decisions dealing with this area of law. Further, the last
two cases demonstrate the willingness of appellate courts to recognize
postpartum depression as a sufficient defense to murder, given com-
pelling testimony and evidence establishing this defense. Neverthe-
less, this remains a volatile area of law, without a clear trend or
accepted position being taken by courts to deal with this issue.
2. California Cases
California courts have decided two of the most recent cases
dealing with the issue of postpartum depression as a defense to mur-
der [infanticide]."' The first occurred in 1983, in the case of People
v. Thompson,"' in which Angela Thompson plead guilty to drown-
ing her nine month old son, Michael, in the bathtub. She defended
her actions by claiming she suffered from postpartum psychosis.
Although Thompson had no psychiatric problems prior to
childbirth, she experienced severe postpartum psychosis and had at-
tempted suicide after the birth of her first child. After her second
pregnancy, Thompson again experienced severe postpartum psycho-
sis and became very delusional. Thompson thought her husband was
Jesus Christ and her baby was the devil. In her warped sense of
reality, Thompson thought that she could kill the devil if she
drowned her baby. Further, Thompson believed that since her hus-
band was Jesus Christ, he would raise the baby from the dead three
days after its death. In so doing, Thompson believed the world
would know that her husband was Jesus Christ. 1 Based upon the
foregoing facts, Thompson was found not guilty by reason of in-
111. California uses a bifurcated trial system whenever a defendant invokes the insanity
defense. As such, the defendant is tried in two distinct stages. At the initial or guilt stage, a
defendant is conclusively presumed sane and tried as any other criminal defendant. If the
defendant is found not guilty during this stage, he or she is released. However, if the defendant
is found guilty, he or she is immediately tried on the issue of sanity by the same or a new jury,
at the discretion of the court. CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFOR-
NIA CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 1152-53 (1986). See generally CAL. PENAL
CODE § 25(c) (Deering 1985).
112. No. CR 13994 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Yolo County, 1983).
113. Donahue: Postpartum Depression, supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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sanity and was required to serve 180 days in a mental institution.1 4
The second California case, People v. Massip 5 represents the
most recent decision in the United States at the trial court level using
postpartum depression as a defense to murder. Sheryl Lynn Massip
was twenty-four years old and happily married when unexpectedly,
she tried to throw her six month old son, Michael, in the path of an
oncoming car."" Being unsuccessful, Massip hit the child on the
head with a blunt instrument, drove the child about five miles from
home, placed him in the middle of the road, and ran him over. Mas-
sip then took the boy's body and placed it in a neighbor's trash
can.
1 17
Originally, Massip told police that the child was kidnapped by
a woman with red hair and a gun," 8 but she later confessed to her
husband that she had killed Michael. Massip claimed that she heard
voices telling her to "put [the child] out of his misery""19 because he
was the devil. Massip's violent disposition towards Michael directly
contravened her earlier desire to be a good mother, as shown in her
previous attempts to seek medical help for Michael's frequent crying
and her taking a class on infant care. Despite these contradictory
actions, the jury refused to accept Massip's defense and Massip was
found guilty of second degree murder of her infant son and faced
sixteen years to life imprisonment.'
However, in an "unprecedented" decision12 ' at sentencing, the
trial judge reduced Massip's second degree murder conviction to vol-
untary manslaughter and then "essentially negate[d]' 22 that convic-
tion and ruled that Massip was not guilty by reason of insanity.' 21
Massip no longer faces imprisonment, but instead now faces the pos-
sibility of psychiatric commitment. The prosecution is appealing this
decision as an abuse of the judge's discretion in overruling the jury's
findings, and this area of law remains unsettled in California.
114. Donahue: Postpartum Depression, supra note 37, at 2.
115. No. C64940 (Cal. Super. Ct., Orange County, Dec. 23, 1988). The facts of this
case are unreported, since it was only decided at the trial level. Hence, the author has relied
upon the newspaper articles cited herein, to recite the facts of this case.
116. Lichtblau, Mother Convicted of Killing Infant Son With Her Car, L.A. Times,
Nov. 18, 1988, at 3, col. 2-3.
117. Id., at 3, col. 2. See also Trigoboff, supra note 5, at 1, col. 3.
118. Lichtblau, supra note 116, at 3, col. 3.
119. Lichtblau, supra note 116, at 3, col. 3.
120. Lichtblau, supra note 116, at 3, col. 3 and 35, col. 2.
121. LichtblauJudge Clears Mother Who Killed Baby, L.A. Times, Dec. 24, 1988, at
18, col. 4.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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C. Cases Currently Pending
There are currently two cases pending which involve a mother
who is accused of killing her child and the mother claims insanity by
virtue of suffering from postpartum depression. One of these cases
dramatically exemplifies the overwhelming effect of severe postpar-
tum depression on a woman after childbirth and is currently await-
ing trial in New York.124
This case involves Lucrenzia Gentile, a forty-three year old wo-
man with no history of psychiatric disorders, who desired to have a
child despite having an infertility problem which prevented her from
conceiving children naturally. As such, Gentile spent $20,000 to arti-
ficially conceive a baby boy' 25 and eventually was characterized as a
"good mother." '26 Nevertheless, two months later on April 29, 1988,
Gentile unexplainedly drowned her son in a bathtub. 2 '
Originally, Gentile had told police that the boy was kidnapped
by two men who had asked her for directions while she was driving,
but upon further police questioning Gentile broke down and admit-
ted that she had killed her baby. The New York grand jury has
charged Gentile with manslaughter in the first degree with the de-
fense of mental impairment, and her trial is currently pending psy-
chiatric examination by the state and is expected to begin in early
1990.128
The second case currently pending in which postpartum depres-
sion is being raised as a defense to murder, is in San Diego, Califor-
nia, and can be characterized as a tragedy that could have been pre-
vented.129 In September 1986, Lorenza Penguelly killed her five
month old daughter, Sara, by throwing her into the San Diego Har-
bor. While at the harbor before the incident, Penguelly had pleaded
with bypassers to take her child, but no one complied. As a result,
the child was found floating in the harbor the next day.'
Although Penguelly had no history of mental illness, she had
experienced mental problems prior to Sara's birth and went to the
124. Mansnerus, supra note 3, at 6, col. 4.
125. Moss, Postpartum Psychosis Defense, A.B.A. J. Aug. 1, 1988, at 22, col. 3.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Telephone interview with John DePaola, attorney for Lucrenzia Gentile (Sept. 1,
1989).
129. People v. Penguelly, No. CR 85667 (San Diego Super. Ct., pending (original in-
formation dismissed due to incompetency at preliminary hearing, Oct. 5, 1988)). For a detailed
account of this case see 20/20: New Mother's Nightmare (ABC television broadcast, Oct, 14,
1988) (videotape on file at Santa Clara Law Review office).
130. Id.
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San Diego social services department for help.' Penguelly ex-
plained to social services how she previously tried to drown her first
child, Carlos, and currently thought of hurting her unborn child.
Penguelly was diagnosed as suffering from severe postpartum de-
pression, hospitalized, and instructed not to return to her child until
her condition had changed.13 2 Penguelly was released a few days
later, despite a Department of Social Services report showing that
there had not been any significant change in her condition.' 8
Friends and relatives stated that there was a significant change
in Penguelly, both physically and emotionally, during this time.
Penguelly was withdrawn and unresponsive, despite previously being
a happy, healthy person. Penguelly was arrested in October 1986.
On October 5, 1988, Penguelly's information was dismissed pursu-
ant to Penal Code section 9953 due to her alleged incompetence at
her preliminary hearing." 5 As such, Penguelly was released to a
state psychiatric hospital for further evaluation to determine when
she would be competent to stand trial.'3 Her case is still pending,
and no trial date has been set.
The outcome of these two cases, as well as any future cases,
depends upon the courts' willingness to accept postpartum depression
as a valid defense to murder. Fortunately, the above cases in New
York and California both have "precedent" dealing with this issue,
albeit conflicting decisions at the trial level. Thus, these states have
some background in dealing with this area of law. Unfortunately,
this area of law remains unguided by legislation throughout the
United States and judicially unsettled.
III. PROBLEM
There are a number of legal obstacles facing women who claim
insanity by virtue of suffering from postpartum depression in defense
of killing their children. First, these women face a general lack of
acceptance by the legal community of the defense of postpartum de-
pression, coupled with the medical community's conflicting "accept-
ance" of this disorder. Second, the crime of infanticide is not enu-
merated by any state legislature in the United States and, thus, falls
131. d.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. CAL. PENAL CODE § 995 (West 1985).
135. People v. Penguelly, CR 85667 (San Diego Sup. Ct., pending).
136. d.
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within the general provisions of homicide. 137 Women who commit
infanticide are prosecuted under homicide statutes and must defend
-themselves against murder charges. Additionally, because postpartum
depression may be these women's only defense to their actions, the
courts and legislatures are, in essence, leaving women suffering from
postpartum depression without a defense.
California does not recognize puerperal psychosis as a mental
impairment sufficient to meet its insanity defense despite the impair-
ment's ability to alter a woman's sense of reality and her ability to
distinguish right from wrong." 8 As such, a woman suffering from
puerperal psychosis meets the criteria established in the
M'Naughten test of insanity, 189 yet she is, nonetheless, subjected to
the possibility of life in prison or even death for her uncontrollable
acts. Without specific legislation dealing with the crime of infanticide
and the mental state of a woman following childbirth, courts will
decide these cases on an ad hoc basis, leading to conflicting decisions
and a lack of guiding judicial precedent. Precise legislation is re-
quired to deal with the crime of infanticide and the mental state of a
woman following childbirth.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Automatic Insanity Presumption
The first step in revising and clarifying the crime of infanticide
and the defense of postpartum depression is the rejection of an auto-
matic presumption of insanity. The very character of mental disor-
ders and insanity make such a classification difficult, as exemplified
by the varying tests of insanity used today."' Insanity is not a "con-
crete" term, but rather it may be defined in various ways and may
be attributable to different causes."" As such, an automatic measure
would be insufficient to account for these differences.
As noted earlier, England's Infanticide Act of 1938 attempts to
resolve some of the difficulties in classifying mental disorders after
childbirth by establishing an automatic reduction in criminal charges
brought against a woman during the first twelve months following
137. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
138. See generally Lee, supra note 3, at 293; Mansnerus, supra note 3, at 6, col. 1.
139. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
141. One author suggests that due to the many different causes and treatments of mental
disorders, "psychiatric laws are so inexact as to be incapable of explaining behavior with suffi-
cient accuracy to be useful in a court of law." Tyrell, Insanity: A Crazy Defense, 35 MED.
TRIAL TECH. Q. 48, 64 (1988).
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childbirth. 4 ' This approach was originally taken to improve the
English legal system's disposition of infanticide cases, which prior to
1922 was unguided and variable. In establishing a "guideline" ena-
bling courts to attain similar holdings, judicial consistency and prece-
dent could be established. The Infanticide Act's effect, however, has
been more detrimental to the English legal system than beneficial,
due to its faulty construction.' 48
The most basic problem with England's Infanticide Act is that
it does not measure a woman's sanity nor does it measure her guilt.
Rather, the Act merely establishes a time frame within which an
accused murderer's guilt will be mitigated. No physical or mental
examination is required; instead a deranged mental state of the wo-
man is assumed. Further, any "deterrent" effect the Act may have
been created for is dispelled by the fact that more than sixty women
have been convicted of killing their babies under this Act during the
past decade, yet none have gone to prison. 44 The Act satisfies its
purpose of creating consistent judicial disposition of these cases, but
neglects examining both legal and medical aspects of the asserted in-
sanity defense.
Similarly, a prosecutor's refusal to bring any charges against an
infanticidal woman suffering from postpartum depression attains the
same results as that of the Infanticide Act; the woman is not impris-
oned for her criminal actions. Neither of these approaches examines
the woman's mental state or satisfies the goals of either the criminal
justice system-to punish those who intended their unlawful
acts-or the mental health community-to provide therapeutic reha-
bilitation. Instead, a blanket assumption is made prior to trial, with-
out any medical examinations or testimony, which assumes that the
woman suffered from a mental deficiency causing her to kill her
child. Hence, the act of a mother killing her child within twelve
142. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
143. There are many criticisms of the InfantijQ.: Act's construction. For example, one
author states:
As the [the Infanticide Act's] wording makes 6i-aF, it is to the process of giving
birth, the effect on the mother's body ...'t. a Ie statute refers. The idea
behind this is that physical processes, whether tey are called chemistry or hys-
teria, can influence behavior in such a way as t! reduce criminal responsibility.
There is ho apparent consistency to this theory;' for if a woman who has given
birth within twelve months kills adults or other children, the Infanticide Act
does not apply. This suggests statutory acknowledgement that social role change
may produce psychosis. But other members of the household, such as fathers,
who may also be affected by role change, cannot rely on the Act.
O'Donovan, supra note 18, at 262.
144. Trigoboff, supra note 5, at 24.
[Vol. 30
POSTPARTUM DEPRESSION
months after its birth is used as an automatic measure of insanity,
while in the cases where no charges are brought, these women avoid
the criminal justice system altogether.
Adopting an. automatic test would literally allow women to get
away with murder. For example, a sane, healthy woman could kill
her child anytime within its first year of life out of hatred or because
she had second thoughts about parenthood, and she would not be
subject to prosecution for murder.
Conversely, an automatic measure would be beneficial to estab-
lishing valid defenses. This approach would allow a mandatory pre-
sumption on the issue of sanity, assuming all woman to be insane
following Qhildbirth. Although such a presumption enables a woman
suffering from puerperal psychosis to easily establish her defense, it
also unnecessarily allows a woman not suffering from this mental
impairment to make an easy case for such a defense. Thus, this ap-
proach would create a virtual fraud in the legal system.
If an automatic approach were applied to the hypothetical case
presented in the introduction, the woman would automatically be
deemed "insane" and would not be charged with murder; she would
only face charges for the lesser crime of involuntary manslaughter.
The woman would not need medical testimony to convince the court
of her deranged state of mind, but would instead have an easy, auto-
matic defense. In this case, the presumption of insanity would be
correct.
However, making a correct presumption of insanity would not
always happen. Unfortunately, this defense could easily be misused
by women who intentionally kill their children. Hence, an automatic
approach would not meet, the purpose behind enacting such legisla-
tion: to recognize a legal, valid defense of postpartum depression.
In sum, an automatic measure of insanity is inappropriate to
meet the purposes of claiming the defense of postpartum depression.
Instead, specific guidelines establishing what conduct falls within
this disorder are needed to enable a court to evaluate a mother's ac-
tions during a puerperal state with accuracy.
B. Complete Rejection of Defense
While an automatic measure of insanity would allow too many
false defenses to be used, a complete rejection of this defense would
prevent any genuine defenses from ever being made. Nonetheless, as
noted earlier, this is the approach taken by the majority of courts in
the United States today.
In cases such as Commmonwealth v. Comitz, where a docu-
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mented medical history for severe postpartum depression was found,
a woman was sentenced to imprisonment for eight to twenty
years. 1M The jury completely refused to accept postpartum depres-
sion as a valid defense to murder " 6 and, thus, a mentally disturbed
woman was imprisoned for acts which she did not intend to commit.
This directly contradicts the purpose of our criminal justice system to
punish those who knowingly commit unlawful acts so that they do
not do them again.1"' Such a deterrence rationale is not satisfied by
imprisoning women who lack the ability to distinguish right from
wrong.
On the other hand, many argue that the repeating factor of
mothers claiming that their child had been kidnapped when, in real-
ity, they themselves had killed or attempted to kill the child shows
that these women could differentiate between right and wrong.14 8
Further, some prosecutors argue that these actions show premedita-
tion for the crime and cite evidence to support their contention.
This evidence is rebutted by experts who claim that such expla-
nations by the mother are a common feature of this syndrome and
have no bearing on a woman's conscious ability to distinguish real-
ity. " 9 The woman's claim that the child was kidnapped is done at a
time when a woman is in a "dissociated state" in which her thoughts
are separated from her feelings, and details are forgotten. 5° Hence,
the kidnapping story becomes a rationalization of the events which
she had no control over and may not remember. The Green case
exemplifies how a woman suffering from this mental impairment
can "forget" the details of her child's death.'
In the hypothetical case presented in the introduction, the wo-
man did not believe that killing her child was wrong. In fact, this
145. 365 Pa. Super. 599, 602, 530 A.2d 473, 474 (1987).
146. Many argue that a jury cannot adequately distance themselves from the facts of a
case in which a mother has killed her child. Berg, supra note 97, at 5. Often, a jury will have
a natural sympathy for the helpless infant victim, which can overwhelm their ability to remain
impartial. As a result, experts say that a jury must be "bowled over by evidence that the
mother didn't know what she was doing" in order to find her insane. This creates a higher
burden of proof on a mentally disturbed woman, and is fundamentally unfair. Berg, supra
note 97, at 5.
147. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
148. Moss, supra note 125, at 22, col. 2.
149. Moss, supra note 125, at 22.
150. Moss, supra note 125, at 22.
151. People v. Green, No. 1273/86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 30, 1988). In the Green case,
Green claimed that she did not recognize her hands as those holding the pillows over her
child's face, and thus could not be responsible for her child's death. Zeldis, supra note 95, at 2,
col. 3.
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woman believed that her actions were not only right but required in
order to save her child. Clearly, absent her suffering from postpar-
tum depression, this woman would never take or even consider such
actions.
Nevertheless, in applying the approach of complete rejection of
this defense, this woman would be committed to imprisonment for
actions which she did not intend. The "deterrence" rationale of the
criminal justice system would not be served and instead a "moral
tenet"15 of this system would be violated by punishing those who
did not intend their actions.
C. California's Approach
Although California has dealt with this issue twice, there is no
true precedent in this area of law. The first case, People v. Thomp-
son, a 1983 trial court decision, accepted postpartum depression as a
legitimate defense to murder, similar to insanity, and would there-
fore seem to be the "precedent" in this area of law. 15  However, in
1984, California changed its substantive rule measuring insanity, al-
though the procedural aspects have remained the same.15 4 While
there is a case directly on point in California, the law in this area
was subsequently overruled, and this case is no longer applicable.
The second case, People v. Massip, 55 the most recent case to
deal with this issue in the United States, also fails to clarify this area
of law. This 1988 trial court decision, admittedly deemed "unprece-
dented,"' 8 accepts postpartum depression as a complete defense to
murder.' 57 The sentencing judge recognized the need for his finding
despite the lack of precedent by saying: "I know people will say I've
overstepped my bounds. But the more I thought about it, the more I
realized I didn't have any choice but to find her insane . . .She
[Massip] was bonkers.' 8
Both of these decisions are trial court decisions, and are tradi-
tionally not given any weight as guiding precedent. Additionally,
even if they may be treated as precedent, this precedent is subject to
152. ABA and APA Proposals, supra note 31, at 137.
153. No. CR 13994 (Cal. Super. Ct., Yolo County, 1983) (this was the only case on
point prior to the 1984 change in California's insanity test).
154. In 1984, California rejected the diminished capacity defense and reinstated the
M'Naughten test for insanity. CAL. PENAL CODE § 25 (Deering 1985).
155. People v. Massip, No. C64940 (Cal. Super. Ct., Orange County, Dec. 23, 1988).
156. Lichtblau, supra note 121, at 18, col 4.
157. Lichtblau, supra note 121, at 18, col 4.
158. Lichtblau, supra note 121, at 18, col 5.
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change in the near future. The Massip decision may be reversed
upon appeal because it lacks judicial precedent, legislative guidance,
and may be deemed an abuse of judicial discretion."5 9 Further, these
cases, like all of the cases dealing with postpartum depression in the
United States, are ad hoc decisions and may be overruled easily by
persuasive prosecutorial arguments.
Given the need to allow genuine claims to be established which
show a woman's inability to distinguish between right and wrong,
California should not completely reject postpartum depression as a
defense to infanticide. Women suffering from this disorder have a
mental impairment which alters their sense of reality so that they
cannot distinguish between right and wrong. Hence, they fall within
the M'Naughten test for insanity.
Likewise, California should not completely accept postpartum
depression as an automatic measure of insanity, due to the ease with
which false claims may be asserted. Instead, California should adopt
legislation which takes a compromise approach between the two ex-
tremes of completely accepting or completely rejecting the defense.
California should recognize postpartum depression as a valid defense
to infanticide while, at the same time, establishing safeguards to en-
sure that the defense is not abused.
V. PROPOSAL
In order to ensure that a mentally disabled woman is not held
criminally responsible for her uncontrollable actions, California must
enact legislation dealing with infanticide and the mental state of a
woman following childbirth. California Penal Code sections 25 and
187 should be amended to read as follows:
California Penal Code section 25.5: [Postpartum Psychosis Defined]
(a) The defense of insanity by virtue of suffering from postpar-
tum psychosis may be used in any criminal prosecution for In-
fanticide as defined by Penal Code Section 187.5.
(b) Postpartum psychosis is defined as a mental impairment suf-
ficient to cause a woman to lose her ability to distinguish be-
tween right and wrong, which occurs in a woman after giving
birth.
(c) In any criminal prosecution for Infanticide, this defense
shall be found by the trier of fact after a subjective determina-
tion is made, based upon medical examinations and testimony
159. Lichtblau, supra note 121, at 18.
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relating to the accused's state of mind, as to the existence of
postpartum psychosis, defined in (b). Relevant criteria in such a
determination include, but are not limited to: prior postpartum
psychiatric disorders, behavioral changes, auditory hallucina-
tions, drastic mood swings, depression, frequent crying, time of
onset of symptoms, time period between childbirth and infan-
ticidal act, and recovery.
(d) Should the trier of fact find that the accused suffered from
postpartum psychosis using the criteria of (c), the accused will
be charged with involuntary manslaughter. Further, the trial
judge shall have the discretion to use postpartum psychosis as a
mitigating factor in sentencing the defendant to either probation
or hospitalization with periodic review.
California Penal Code section 187.5: [Infanticide defined]
(a) Infanticide is the unlawful killing of a human being less
than one year old.
(b) Every person guilty of infanticide shall be charged with
murder, in accordance with Penal Code Section 189 and pun-
ished in accordance with Penal Code Section 190.
(c) This section shall not apply to any person who commits an
act or omission which results in the death of an infant if the act
or omission was committed by the biological mother of the in-
fant while she was suffering from postpartum psychosis as de-
fined in Penal Code Section 25.5.
This legislation solves the problems discussed previously in this
comment. First, it defines infanticide as a distinct crime, apart from
the general provisions on homicide. This is necessary because to deny
recognition of infanticide as a separate and distinct crime is to invite
juries to decide these cases on an ad hoc basis, with a strong bias
toward conviction for murder. 60 For example, in Massip a jury con-
victed a woman of second degree murder, for which she faced sixteen
-years to life imprisonment, despite being presented with overwhelm-
ing evidence that Massip was "bonkers."' 1 Further, public sympa-
thy for these helpless infants often makes disposition of these cases
inconsistent without legislative guidance. This dispositional inconsis-
tency is demonstrated in Comitz'62 and Skeoch, 63 where inconsistent
verdicts were found despite similar fact patterns.
160. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
161. Lichtblau, supra note 121, at 18, col. 5.
162. People v. Comitz, 365 Pa. Super. 599, 530 A.2d 473 (1987).
163. People v. Skeoch, 408 Ill. 276, 96 N.E.2d 473 (1951).
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Second, this legislation establishes guidelines on how legally to
determine the existence of postpartum depression in cases of infanti-
cide. A uniform guide is needed due to the conflict present in the
medical community over the existence and genuineness of postpar-
tum psychiatric disorders."' Relevant criteria may include prior psy-
chiatric problems, unexplained mood swings, hallucinations, time of
onset, recovery, if noted, and the time interval between the birth of
the child and the alleged murder. This evidence should be presented
through medical testimony at trial after a complete psychiatric exam-
ination and evaluation. Further, the ultimate determination on the
issue of sanity should be made by the jury, whose basic function is to
weigh and make a decision based upon the facts presented at trial.' 65
Third, once a woman is shown to have suffered from postpar-
tum depression through sufficient medical examination and testi-
mony, the crime charged should be reduced from murder to involun-
tary manslaughter. Should a woman be unsuccessful in establishing
a postpartum depression defense after killing her child, she would
still be charged with murder. In this case, her trial would be the
same as any other homicide case.
Lastly, the trial judge is given the discretion to use this disorder
as a mitigating factor at sentencing, with usual sentencing being ei-
ther probation or hospitalization. This approach is justified and rea-
sonable given the excellent recovery rate which women suffering
from postpartum depression display'66 which dispels any threat these
women might pose to society after the incident. Likewise, the threat
these women might pose to their future children is dispelled through
effective utilization of medical treatment to avoid the harmful effects
of postpartum depression. 67
164. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
165. ABA and APA Proposals, supra note 31, at 147. As the authors put it:
Juries must routinely use common sense and experience to make legal and
moral judgments in light of uncertain knowledge . . . a verdict on insanity is
not just a judgment about the medical facts, but whether those and other facts
lead jurors to believe that a person should not be held responsible for his ac-
tions. It is not the psychiatrists' province to tell us who is blameworthy and who
is not-that is society's judgment, expressed through a jury which hears evi-
dence and arrives at its verdict.
ABA and APA Proposals, supra note 31, at 147 (citing letter by Leonard S. Rubenstein,
attorney for the Mental Health Law Project).
166. J. HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 120 (postpartum depressive disorders, although
varying in duration, are usually self-limiting).
167. Successful treatment of severe postpartum depression is currently being accom-
plished by doctors in England. Angela Thompson is an example of how a woman can have a
normal pregnancy and maintain a healthy relationship with her child, despite a prior incident
of severe postpartum depression which caused her to kill her younger child, if given the appro-
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The discretion exemplified by the sentencing judge in the Mas-
sip case goes beyond the discretion suggested in this comment. In
that case, the judge used his discretion not only to reduce the charge
brought against Massip, but also to overturn a jury's finding of san-
ity. Lacking any legal precedent to do so, the judge deemed his deci-
sion "extraordinary relief" 68 and commented, "[tihis is new ground
that we've plowed today . . . I don't know of another court that
came to the decision like the one I did." '1 69
The discretion suggested herein does not allow a judge to over-
turn a jury's findings of fact, but instead urges the judge to use his
discretion to uphold the jury's overall findings of fact, using postpar-
tum depression as a mitigating factor at sentencing, once the jury
determines guilt. Although the judge in Massip attained the same
end as that suggested herein, the means used to attain that end over-
stepped the bounds of a trial judge. As such, this decision is subject
to being easily overruled for lack of guiding precedent.
Applying this proposed approach to the hypothetical case in the
introduction, the woman would undergo a medical examination and
if, after testimony at trial, a jury determined that she suffered from
postpartum depression, she would be charged with involuntary man-
slaughter. On the other hand, should the medical testimony reveal
that she did not suffer from postpartum psychosis, she would be
charged with murder. Given the facts presented in this hypothetical
case, the woman would be charged with involuntary
manslaughter.1 70
Once the crime to be charged is determined, a jury would decide
upon a verdict as in all other homicide cases. However, if a woman
was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter because she suffered
from postpartum depression, then the judge would have discretion to
determine the woman's sentence using postpartum depression as a
mitigating factor. Ideally, this woman would be hospitalized or put
on probation, and would not be required to serve a prison term. Ab-
sent this finding, however, the woman would be treated as in any
priate medical treatment. Donahue: Postpartum Depression, supra note 37, at 2, 8.
168. Lichtblau, supra note 121, at 18, col. 1.
169. Lichtblau, supra note 121, at 18, cols. 1-2. The trial judge in this case, the honora-
ble Robert R. Fitzgerald, has come under tremendous public scrutiny for his disposition of the
Massip case. He received over sixty letters, some of which "sharply attacked his position and
called for his ouster." Lichtblau, Psychiatric Exam Ordered for Mother Who Killed Her Baby,
L.A. Daily J., Feb. 4, 1989, at 31, col. 4.
170. The civil implications of this approach are not discussed in this comment. To see
how some courts have dealt with the civil issues surrounding postpartum psychosis, see supra
notes 41, 45 and accompanying text.
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other homicide case.
This approach satisfies the goals of both the criminal law sys-
tem and the mental health community.' Mothers whose intentional
acts harm their child are punished with imprisonment, while women
suffering from postpartum depression are hospitalized for their un-
controllable acts.
VI. CONCLUSION
Postpartum depression is a mental disorder which has inconsis-
tent acceptance in both the medical and legal communities. Conse-
quently, the defense of postpartum depression to murder is not ac-
cepted by the majority of courts in the United States. There is no
uniformity in this area of law. While the majority of courts dealing
with this defense reject it, a growing number of courts recognize
postpartum depression as a valid defense to infanticide. These deci-
sions are unguided by legislation specifically dealing with this area
of law and thus are decided on an ad hoc basis.
In order to ensure uniformity in this area of law, legislation is
needed to enumerate both the crime of infanticide and the mental
state of a woman following childbirth. In order to meet the purpose
behind the insanity defense itself, this legislation should neither com-
pletely reject nor completely accept postpartum depression as a valid
defense to murder. By taking a middle approach, courts will be able
to use their discretion to evaluate a case while at the same time hav-
ing an automatic charge reduction once this disorder is proven. In
this way, the criminal justice system and the mental health commu-
nity can best serve their purposes of justice and fairness.
Debora K. Dimino
171.
There has been a great deal of disagreement between the two professions (legal
system and mental health science] on the general philosophic question whether
psychiatry and the law are antithetical as to purpose and function. For some,
the most basic purpose of the law is the formulation and imposition of moral
values; mental health science, on the other hand, seeks only to arrive at verifia-
ble, value-neutral diagnostic and therapeutic conclusions. Some view the pur-
pose of the mental health practitioner strictly in therapeutic terms; while the
legal system (i.e., the criminal justice system) is viewed as punitive and essen-
tially unconcerned with therapeutic rehabilitation.
Note, supra note 31, at 460.
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